Religious beliefs and philosophical views: a qualitative study by De Cruz, Helen
 1 
Religious beliefs and philosophical views: A qualitative study  
Helen De Cruz, Oxford Brookes University 
This is a draft. Please find the final version in Res Philosophica.  
Abstract  
Philosophy of religion is often regarded as a philosophical discipline in which irrelevant 
influences, such as upbringing and education, play a pernicious role. This paper presents 
results of a qualitative survey among academic philosophers of religion to examine the 
role of such factors in their work. In light of these findings, I address two questions: an 
empirical one (whether philosophers of religion are influenced by irrelevant factors in 
forming their philosophical attitudes) and an epistemological one (whether the 
influence of irrelevant factors on our philosophical views should worry us). My answer 
to the first question is a definite yes, my answer to the second, a tentative yes.  
 
1. Introduction 
Philosophers value rational belief-formation, in particular, if it concerns their 
philosophical views. Authors such as Descartes (1641/1992) and al-Ghazālī (1100/1952) 
thought it was possible to cast off the preconceptions they grew up with. Descartes 
likened the beliefs an adult has acquired since childhood to apples one can cast out of a 
basket one by one, to critically examine which ones are rotten and which ones are 
sound. Al-Ghazālī wrote in his autobiographical defense of Sufi mysticism that he started 
questioning the beliefs he acquired through his parents the moment he realized their 
pervasive influence in how religious views are formed:  
... as I drew near the age of adolescence the bonds of mere authority 
(taqlīd) ceased to hold me and inherited beliefs lost their grip upon me, for 
I saw that Christian youths always grew up to be Christians, Jewish youths 
 2 
to be Jews and Muslim youths to be Muslims  (al-Ghazālī, ca. 1100 [1952], 
21). 
Al-Ghazālī and Descartes assumed that mere reflective awareness of the role of 
irrelevant influences in one’s religious beliefs is enough to counteract their distorting 
influence. Yet there is an increasing recognition that philosophical viewpoints and 
arguments are embedded within a broader cognitive and socio-cultural context, and 
that one cannot simply cast off the beliefs one has acquired as a result of this context.  
This has become especially clear with the development of experimental philosophy, a 
philosophical method that aims to shed light on philosophical intuitions and background 
assumptions using empirical means. One branch of experimental philosophy has 
focused on intuitions (the so-called “intuitional program”, Sytsma and Livengood 2016). 
The intuitional program has uncovered substantial variations in intuitions about 
knowledge, beliefs, moral responsibility, and free will, depending on factors such as 
culture (Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2004, Machery et al. 2017), and perhaps 
also—but more contentiously—gender (Buckwalter & Stich, 2014, but see Adleberg, 
Thompson, & Nahmias 2015).  
Experimental philosophical studies have put pressure on the tacitly accepted view that 
philosophical positions are solely arrived at through careful reflection and argument. For 
example, Schwitzgebel and Cushman’s (2012, 2015) experiments on framing effects in 
trolley scenarios demonstrate that philosophers are not immune to contextual factors 
when they make philosophical judgments. In these experiments, philosophy PhDs and 
MAs, non-philosophy PhDs and MAs, and people without PhD or MA degree, were 
presented with a series of trolley scenarios involving a personal harming action (pushing 
a man off a footbridge to stop a train that would otherwise kill five people) and 
scenarios involving no personal contact (flipping a switch to divert a trolley from a track 
that has five people on it to just one person). Participants were then asked to what 
extent they endorsed the doctrine of double effect (whether using one person’s death 
as a means of saving others is morally better, worse, or the same as killing one person as 
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a side effect of saving others) and whether harming people in a personal, face-to-face 
way is morally better, worse, or the same as harming someone at a distance (the 
personal principle). Philosophers were less likely to endorse the doctrine of double 
effect and the personal principle if the push scenario was presented prior to the switch 
scenario. They did so even when they were encouraged to reflect on this task, and in 
spite of the fact that the doctrine of double effect can hardly have been new to them.   
There is thus increasing evidence that philosophers are subject to non-rational factors in 
their work. Several authors have argued that philosophy of religion is particularly 
vulnerable to the pernicious influence of factors such as personal beliefs and upbringing, 
and emotional investment. For example, Draper and Nichols (2013) contend that 
philosophy of religion, more than other philosophical disciplines, is affected by cognitive 
bias and group influence. Levine (2000, 89) diagnoses analytic philosophy of religion 
with a lack of vitality and seriousness in its treatment of topics, notably the problem of 
evil: if philosophers of religion weren’t already convinced that God exists, they would 
not accept or formulate the rather slipshod solutions to the problem of evil. The worry 
these authors have is that philosophy of religion is a thinly veiled form of apologetics, 
where the conclusions philosophers draw are already accepted in advance.  
A related concern is that philosophy of religion may be intellectually impoverished, 
reflecting the beliefs of its practitioners (primarily, Christian theists and a minority of 
scientific naturalists), rather than a much richer palette of religious views that remain 
unanalyzed. Most analytic philosophers work in an environment where Christian theism 
and scientific naturalism are the two main metaphysical views on offer, which may 
explain why these are the only ones that have been subject to systematic philosophical 
scrutiny. Alternative positions such as pantheism, deism, or ietsism are rarely 
mentioned (Schellenberg, 2015), let alone thick theological views as can be found, for 
instance, in Hinduism or Mormonism. Next to this, philosophy of religion may be too 
narrowly focused on the rationality of theistic beliefs at the expense of other questions 
(Schilbrack, 2014). This focus on rationality might be motivated by a defensive attitude 
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in some philosophers of religion to desecularize academic philosophy, and in others (of 
a naturalistic inclination) to restore it to its former secularized state (e.g., Smith, 2001).  
Recent studies suggest a non-trivial role of such contextual factors in shaping the views 
of philosophers of religion. For example, philosophy of religion has disproportionately 
many theists compared to other philosophical disciplines (see e.g., Bourget & Chalmers, 
2014, see also subsection 4.2 for how the present survey compares to these findings). 
Philosophers of religion are influenced by their religious beliefs in their evaluation of 
religious arguments, with theists reacting more positively to arguments that are in favor 
of God’s existence (Tobia, 2016) and atheists evaluating arguments against the 
existence of God more positively (De Cruz and De Smedt, 2016).  
These findings indicate a correlation between irrelevant influences and philosophical 
views, but do not as such demonstrate causation. Qualitative data that directly look at 
the role of contextual factors in philosophy of religion can shed light on how factors 
such as upbringing, personal experience, and emotional attachment shape philosophical 
views. This, in turn, can help us to tackle a broader normative question, which has 
received attention in the recent epistemological literature: is the role of such factors in 
shaping philosophical views rationally permissive? This paper presents a qualitative 
survey with philosophers of religion to help answer two questions:  
Empirical question To what extent are philosophers of religion influenced by non-
philosophical factors, such as upbringing, personal experience, and emotional 
attachment, in forming their philosophical attitudes?  
Epistemological question Is the role of such influences in philosophy of religion rationally 
permissible?  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I examine how irrelevant factors might 
shape views in the philosophy of religion. Section 3 discusses the methodology of the 
qualitative survey; section 4 provides a detailed analysis of its findings. In section 5, I 
assess concerns that philosophers of religion might be influenced by personal religious 
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beliefs and upbringing. I argue that some of these worries are exaggerated, but that 
others present a serious epistemic challenge. I address the broader question of whether 
irrelevant influences on philosophical practice might interfere with our ability to 
rationally maintain philosophical beliefs.  
 
2. Irrelevant influences on philosophical practice  
Epistemologists debate to what extent evidence should determine what we could 
rationally believe. Typically, when a subject S believes that p she does so on the basis of 
justifying reasons, such as arguments or evidence for p, and also as a result of other 
(non-justifying) reasons, such as wanting p to be true. Broader causal factors also play a 
role, for example, S may believe that p because she was raised in a culture where belief 
that p is prevalent. An often-discussed example comes from Cohen (2000, 16–18), who 
mused that the majority of Oxford graduate students of his generation accept the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, whereas most Harvard students tend to reject it. On the 
face of it, it seems problematic that one’s acceptance or rejection of this philosophical 
thesis is dependent on the graduate school one happened to attend. For the purposes 
of this paper, I will denote non-justifying reasons and broader causal factors as 
irrelevant factors (IFs). These are defined by Vavova (2018, 136) as follows:  
An irrelevant influence (factor) for me with respect to my belief that p is one 
that (a) has influenced my belief that p and (b) does not bear on the truth of 
p.  
Should philosophers be worried about the role of IFs in their work? This question relates 
to the permissivism/uniqueness debate in epistemology. According to proponents of 
uniqueness, a total body of evidence permits only one rational doxastic attitude: for a 
given proposition p, “there is just one rationally permissible doxastic attitude one can 
take, given a particular body of evidence” (White, 2014, 312). Uniqueness is a strong 
thesis; it is stronger than evidentialism, which says that S is justified (not necessarily 
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required) to take a doxastic attitude to p iff taking that attitude is epistemically fitting, 
given her total evidence (Ballantyne & Coffman, 2012). White (2014) has argued that 
cases where IFs play a large role in belief formation are akin to ingesting a pill that 
randomly leads to a belief that p nor not-p, or swallowing a pill that would randomly 
lower your credence that p to .1 or increase it to .7. The randomness of such pill-
popping cases, White thinks, is not dissimilar to accidental factors outside of our own 
control, such as the religious background of our parents.   
By contrast, permissivists (e.g., Schoenfield, 2014, Vavova, 2018) argue that there is 
some latitude when we form our beliefs and credences. In some cases, we can rationally 
respond to a given body of evidence in more than one way, coming from a variety of 
starting points, and perhaps also use different epistemic principles to arrive at our 
reasoning. Proponents of permissivism offer both intuitive and formal considerations for 
their position. Intuitively, it seems obvious that there are many instances where people 
rationally disagree, such as scientists coming to divergent conclusions based on their 
differing evaluations of sources of evidence. To dismiss such disagreements as 
unreasonable, or to deem the scientists’ conclusions irrational because of background 
factors beyond their control, seems implausible. Formally, many theories of rationality 
(e.g., coherentism, subjective Bayesianism) require that permissivism is true 
(Schoenfield, 2014).  
However, the claim that it is sometimes permissible to have more than one rational 
response to a given body of evidence does not mean that this would always be the case. 
Indeed, as Schoenfield (2014) argues, there are many situations where finding out that 
one has been subject to IFs when forming the belief that p is a proper cause to lower 
one’s confidence in the credence that p. For example, suppose a voter was targeted by a 
tailored political campaign (based on her FaceBook likes, posts, and private messages 
suggesting she is anxious and xenophobic) with fake news suggesting that Muslim 
immigrants are swamping the country. After days of seeing such misleading news 
articles and ads, the voter comes to the belief that this is indeed the case. When she 
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finds out that she was the target of a tailored campaign, it seems commendable for her 
to doubt her belief that Muslim immigrants are swamping the country, and she would 
probably do well to double-check the news sites and other alleged sources of 
information she saw. While there are a few claims in the literature that higher-order 
evidence is irrelevant when evaluating first-order evidence (e.g., Kelly, 2005), most 
authors argue that not every attitude formed as a result of IFs is rational (e.g., Kelly, 
2014; Horowitz, 2014).  
Permissivism is thus a general claim that it is sometimes permissible to have divergent 
rational responses, but fleshing out the specifics of when the evidence permits multiple 
rational attitudes has been tricky. If IFs were like White’s (2014) pill-popping cases, it 
would be difficult to maintain our beliefs formed as a result of IFs in the face of 
knowledge about their origins. For one thing, a pill-induced belief (if such a belief can 
exist) is highly isolated, because ingesting the pill is a single event quite distinct from our 
other actions. By contrast, religious and political beliefs are the result of a rich tapestry 
of IFs such as the religious beliefs of one’s parents and friends. Moreover, they are 
closely connected to other beliefs. Some authors (e.g., Simpson, 2017; Vavova, 2018) 
have attempted to outline general principles that might help us distinguish situations 
where permissivism is plausible from situations where we should be genuinely worried 
about the role of IFs in our belief formation. Simpson (2017), for instance, thinks that 
one can be a permissivist about a given question Q if the agents involved disagree about 
Q because they have different cognitive abilities and apply different standards. In this 
paper, I adopt a moderately permissivist attitude1, i.e., I hold that there is often more 
than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence, but that not all IFs are                                                         
1 There is disagreement about what would constitute a moderate degree of permissivism. 
According to White (2014), strong permissivism means that different people could, in some 
cases, believe p or not-p based on the same body of evidence, whereas moderate permissivism 
means that they can have different degrees of confidence that p is true. Horowitz (2014) and 
Kelly (2014) see moderate permissivism as the view that rational responses can be situated 
within a certain range. Other forms of moderate permissivism (e.g., Vavova, 2018) focus on the 
sources of IFs rather than how people respond in the face of IFs and evidence. I will adopt a 
source-permissivist position in section 5.  
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equally epistemically benign.  
The role of IFs may be prominent in philosophical domains that intersect with opinions 
laypeople commonly hold and express in everyday life, such as ethics, political 
philosophy (see Cohen, 2000, for a discussion of this), and philosophy of religion. I will 
concentrate on philosophy of religion as it has recently been criticized for its perceived 
lack of impartiality and neutrality.   
 
3. Methodology  
To address the empirical question, I have used an open, anonymized survey that was 
exclusively aimed at academic philosophers of religion (i.e., at least at the graduate 
student level, working in a university context)2. The survey was structured as a series of 
open and multiple-choice questions, as follows:  
Open questions 
1. How would you describe your current professional position, including your function in 
the department (e.g., assistant professor), the type of school where you are working 
(e.g., a small liberal arts college, a research-intensive department, a regional teaching-
oriented state school)? Is the school faith-based?  
2. What are your primary areas of interest within philosophy?  
3. Can you tell something about the factors that contributed to your specializing in 
philosophy of religion?  
                                                        
2 A detailed examination of the role of qualitative research in philosophy lies outside of the 
scope of this paper. For a thorough overview of the prospects of qualitative studies in 
experimental philosophy, see Andow (2016, 1229), who says about qualitative surveys, “The 
most straightforward way of gathering qualitative data would be via surveys which incorporate 
open response questions.” The present study utilizes this method.  
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4. How would you describe the reactions of others (e.g., your advisor, your colleagues) 
when you considered to specialize in philosophy of religion?3  
5. How would you describe your personal religious beliefs, or lack thereof?  
6. Do you consider yourself to be a member of one or more religious denominations or 
secular organizations with ideological content? If so, which one(s)?  
7. Did your religious beliefs change over time, especially in the time since you were a 
philosopher? Could you describe this change (if applicable)?  
8. How would you describe the relationship between your personal religious beliefs, or 
lack thereof, and your work in philosophy of religion?  
9. (Optional) Are there any additional anecdotes or personal observations that you think 
are relevant for this study? 
Multiple choice questions for demographic data 
What is your age (in years)? 
What is your gender (male/female/other)? 
How many years have elapsed since you received your PhD? (I am still a graduate 
student/less than 1 year/1-5 years/6-10 years/11-20 years/more than 20 years/I am not 
a PhD in philosophy and not a graduate student).  
In what country do you work? (Dropdown list of countries)  
As can be seen in this survey, I explicitly ask participants to reflect on the irrelevant 
influences that have shaped their philosophical thinking. Thus, the survey relies on self-
report, which has limitations that have been discussed in detail in the psychological                                                         
3 In the framework of this paper, the responses to this question were not analyzed.  
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literature. The most prominent of these are:  
(1) Inability to identify some of the IFs: given that experimental philosophers are 
uncovering IFs that philosophers were previously unaware of, which play a role in their 
evaluation of philosophical scenarios (e.g., ordering effects, framing effects, cultural 
differences in intuitions), it is likely that my participants did not identify all the IFs that 
might possibly impact their work. 
(2) Socially desirable responding: this is the tendency of participants to present a 
favorable image of themselves. It may distort the results of both qualitative and 
quantitative studies, on a variety of subjects such as charitable donation, dietary habits, 
and exercising (van de Mortel, 2008). Likewise, even though this survey was anonymous, 
philosophers may have responded to it in such a way that it enhanced their image. 
Given that philosophers like to think of themselves as reasoners who are mainly guided 
by rational argument and inference, this might lead respondents to minimize the role of 
IFs in their work.  
From (1) and (2) we can predict that the IFs discussed in the present survey are likely an 
underestimation of the actual extent to which philosophers of religion are influenced by 
IFs in their work. Recently, more quantitative approaches (e.g., Tobia, 2016, De Cruz & 
De Smedt, 2016) have attempted to reveal unconscious bias in the evaluation of 
philosophical arguments for the existence of God. While such studies are better at 
avoiding social desirability responding and can also potentially uncover biases that 
participants are not consciously aware of, they are typically narrower in the kinds of IFs 
that are being explored (in the studies mentioned, theistic belief). Due to (2) that 
philosophers would overestimate the role of IFs in their work. Therefore, the survey is 
useful for identifying a range of IFs that philosophers of religion experience in their work, 
even though it might not accurately portray the extent to which philosophers of religion 
are influenced by IFs (which is more likely to be underreported than over reported), it is  
Given that my emphasis will be on identifying this range of IFs, and given that the survey 
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is qualitative, the results will not in detail explore inferential statistics or possible 
significant correlations (with a few motivated exceptions, as can be seen in the next 
section). The reason for this is that the true range of IFs is likely even wider, and the 
extent to which they operate probably more pervasive. These limitations of the survey, 
as well as its exploratory character, need to be kept in mind when evaluating the results.  
Participants were invited through a philosophy mailing list (Philos-L) and widely read 
philosophy blogs (Prosblogion, Feminist Philosophers). The invitation clearly stated that 
the survey was exclusively aimed at professional philosophers of religion (the multiple-
choice survey question on how many years had elapsed post-PhD was used to exclude 
people who are not professional philosophers. Graduate students were included, but 
people who were neither graduate students nor PhD holders were excluded). 
Participants received an open questionnaire of nine questions, which they could fill in 
without upper or lower word limit; they could choose to leave questions unanswered. 
Typed responses were collected directly using Qualtrics survey software.  
Two coders coded the answers to questions 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 using coding schemes I 
developed for this study (section 4 provides details on the instructions coders received). 
Coders were postgraduate students at the University of Oxford, one was completing a 
BPhil philosophy, the other was a graduate student in theology. They received a training 
session on pilot responses that were provided to the open questions to make sure they 
understood the coding scheme. To preserve anonymity of the respondents, coders 
received a version of the survey that was stripped of all the responses to multiple-choice 
questions (i.e., they had no information about the respondents’ gender, age, or country 
of residence). Given that the coding schemes were quite complex, Cohen’s kappa, a 
measure of inter-rater agreement, was moderate κ= .78 for question 3, .82 for question 
5, .739 for question 7, and .791 for question 8. Disagreements were resolved through in-
person discussion. Due to the exploratory and qualitative nature of this study, the focus 
will be on the reporting of qualitative data rather than statistical analysis.  
As philosophy of religion is a relatively small field, insiders might be able to guess the 
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identity of some respondents. To reduce this risk of identification, I report at most one 
response per participant (participants were informed about this). I did not edit 
responses, except for obvious typographic errors.  
 
4. Findings  
4.1 Respondents  
150 philosophers of religion participated in the survey. 134 participants completed all 
questions (that is, all questions from 1 to 8, as question 9 was clearly marked optional), 
5 respondents completed all but one or two of the questions, and 11 answered only a 
few questions. My analysis includes the surveys that were completed or nearly 
completed (with nearly completed I mean that one or two of the open questions were 
not answered; this does not include the optional question 9), N = 139. 83% of the 
respondents were male; the remaining 17% were female (no respondent indicated 
another gender). This sample is thus more skewed toward men than the gender 
distribution in philosophy, which has about 20-25% women in the UK and the US4. In 
philosophy of religion, the gender distribution is likely lower than the discipline average, 
with informal counts of membership of the Society for Christian Philosophers and 
attendance to philosophy of religion conferences suggesting about 10% are women (see 
Van Dyke, 2015, for discussion of the causes and potential remedies). The mean age in 
the sample was 43 years (SD = 13.6). Most participants were from the USA (47%), the UK 
(27%), and Canada (5%).  
Respondents were working in a wide variety of institutions, for example, faith-based 
small liberal arts colleges in the United States, large research-oriented universities in                                                         4 Data from US doctoral granting departments in 2015 suggest about 23.14% of tenure 
track or tenured faculty members are female;  
http://web.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/doctoral_2004.html. In the UK, the percentage of 
female permanent post holders stands at about 24% (Beebee & Saul, 2011) 
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Germany, research-intensive institutions (Russell Group) in the United Kingdom, and 
two-year teaching-focused community colleges in the United States. For question 1 (Is 
the school faith-based?), 30% of respondents reported working in faith-based 
institutions. Some of these colleges were mainly faith schools in name, e.g., “[my school 
is] officially faith-based but it’s hard to tell in practice—most students outside our 
faculty don’t seem to know or care”, “The university is religiously oriented, but does not 
discriminate in hiring or admissions on the basis of religion.”  
4.2 The religious beliefs of philosophers of religion  
Responses to question 5 “How would you describe your personal religious beliefs, or 
lack thereof?” were coded into the following categories: (1) Christian theist, for 
respondents who explicitly identify as Christian or member of a Christian denomination, 
(2) Other theist, for anyone who explicitly mentions a non-Christian monotheistic 
religion, such as Judaism or Islam, (3) Other religious believer, e.g., polytheist, (4) 
Unspecified religious believer, someone who says they are religious but do not specify 
the religion, (5) Atheist, someone who says they are an atheist, or reject any form of 
supernaturalism, (6) Agnostic, (7) It’s complicated/other, anyone who does not fit in the 
above categories. Figure 1 shows a summary of the results with the number of 
participants in each category in N (categories 3 and 7 are merged to make the results 
more readable).  
 
 
Figure 1: Religious beliefs of participants in the sample (in N). 
In line with earlier surveys that examined the religious beliefs of philosophers of religion 
(Bourget & Chalmers, 2014), a majority of respondents (N = 85, 61.1%) were theists. The 
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vast majority of these were Christian theists (N = 80, 57.6%). Comparing the present 
findings with earlier surveys (see table 1 for a summary), there is an association 
between being a philosopher of religion and being a theist. But, as we will see further on 
in this paper, this correlation does not show what the direction of causation might be. 
There might be multiple causal pathways to explain the result. For example, it could be 
that a religious believer has more personal investment in philosophical arguments about 
the supernatural, just like someone who likes or engages in sports is more likely to find 
the philosophy of sport relevant (see De Cruz & De Smedt, 2016).  
Survey Percentage 
theists in 
Philosophy of 
religion 
Percentage of 
theists not in 
philosophy of 
religion 
Total 
sample size 
Number of 
philosophers 
of religion in 
the sample 
Effect 
Size 
(Cramer’s 
V) 
Bourget and 
Chalmers 
2014 
72.3%  11.6% 931 
 
47 .38 
De Cruz and 
De Smedt 
2016 
73.1% 23.9% 802 271 .474 
De Cruz 
2017 
60.5% 15% 
518 
119 .455 
Present 
survey 
61.1% NA (this 
survey is only 
focused on 
philosophers 
of religion) 
139 139 NA  
Table 1: Summary of the association between theism and philosophy of religion as area 
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of specialization as found in previous surveys and the present survey. All p-values are 
<.001. The present survey has no p-value or effect size calculated because there is no 
contrasting group of non-philosophers of religion for comparison.  
Looking more into the respondents who called themselves Christian theist, respondents 
tend to self-identify as traditional or orthodox, e.g., “fairly conservative”, “devout, 
Orthodox, practicing open Christian.” Some explicitly endorsed the Nicene Creed: “I am 
committed to the central claims of the Christian tradition, captured in the Nicene 
Creed”, “I affirm the Apostle’s creed and the Nicene Creed. Beyond that, while I have 
opinions, I regard things as pretty unsettled and tentative.” Moreover, a majority of 
Christians in the sample identified with specific denominations or movements, for 
instance: “Committed Christian (Eastern Orthodox, specifically),” “tortured but 
enthusiastic Roman Catholic”, “I’m a relatively theologically conservative Evangelical 
Christian”, “orthodox Anglican ... a traditionally minded Christian”, “I do not currently 
attend an Anglican or Episcopal church, but I still identify with the worldwide Anglican 
Communion”. Non-Christian theists were decidedly in the minority: only one Muslim 
and four Jewish participants completed the survey. These results are in line with the 
perception that the majority of philosophers of religion are Christian theists (e.g. Smith, 
2001), and that most of them are fairly traditional. 
Next to Christian theists, the most frequent self-identification was atheist (N = 25, 18%). 
For example,   
I am an atheist (although I was raised Protestant Christian). I am not a rabid 
or evangelical atheist (I try to avoid having the “convert’s zeal”); I merely 
disbelieve in God’s existence. — male associate professor at an 
international branch campus of a large, research-oriented US university.  
5.8% (N = 8) respondents were agnostic, for example:  
I am agnostic, I am afraid. I put this that way, because I think that 
agnosticism is perhaps a most fair stance to take (we do not know whether 
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God exists or not, and we are unable to prove that he does or does not, so 
this is the most intellectually fair option), but, altogether, it somehow 
seems to me insufficient (like a kind of ideological minimalism, which can  
easily transfer into intellectual laziness). — female graduate student, Polish 
small liberal arts college.  
10.8% (N = 15) participants had beliefs that fall outside of traditional theism, atheism, or 
agnosticism (coded in the categories 3 and 7). These participants frequently voiced 
conflicting beliefs and doubts, for instance:  
Struggled to carve out a conceptual space for myself as a spiritual person, 
without having any typically “religious” beliefs. I believe in a God, and in 
my relationship to God as the source of value and meaning in my life. 
However, I doubt the veracity of almost all tenets of the Christian tradition 
I was raised in, and which dominates my department. — male graduate 
student, faith-based institution, US.  
Some of these non-orthodox beliefs included panentheism, pantheism, and polytheism, 
for instance:  
Indeterminate polytheism (there is an indeterminate number of gods in the 
actual world, whose properties/attributes and functions we don’t know.) 
— male assistant professor, Turkey.  
I suppose I am a philosophical panentheist. I don’t belong to any organized 
religious tradition, but I did have a religious experience when I was in my 
teens that convinced me of the truth of some kind of minimal super- or 
extra-naturalist picture of the world. I think that what underlies the 
entirety of the universe is divine, and that it is not exhausted by what is in 
the natural world, and that it is purposive. — male graduate student, US.  
The remainder either described themselves generically as “religious believer” or simply 
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“religious” without any further specification (N =3), or declined to provide any religious 
affiliation (N = 3).  
4.3 Motivations for specializing in philosophy of religion  
Why did respondents choose to specialize in philosophy of religion (question 3, “Can 
you tell something about the factors that contributed to your specializing in philosophy 
of religion”)? To code responses, coders used the following categories: (1) Religious 
upbringing, (e.g., Christian parents) that kindled the respondents interest in the topic, 
(2) Religious identity or experience (e.g., a personal connection or affiliation to a 
religious denomination), (3) Proselytism, witness, apologetics: the wish to propagate 
particular religious or areligious views, (4) Philosophical interest, finding religious 
questions interesting from a primarily philosophical perspective, for instance, wanting 
to know whether theism is true, whether the existence of God can be proved, 
connection to other areas of philosophy such as metaphysics or ethics, (5) respondents 
found Religion a culturally, historically, or sociologically interesting phenomenon, (6) 
Education, including educational background (e.g., theology undergraduate), an 
inspiring professor or lecture series, (7) Other. Coders could select multiple categories 
when appropriate.  
The most frequent response was religious identity or experience (36%, N = 50), followed 
by philosophical interest (33.1%, N = 46), education (20.1%, N = 28), and interest in 
religion as a culturally, historically, or sociologically interesting phenomenon (14.4%, N = 
20). Upbringing and childhood experiences were mentioned by 15 participants (10.8%). 
In spite of the widespread perception of philosophy of religion as apologetics (even by 
some respondents in this survey, see below), 7.2% (N = 10) mentioned witness, 
proselytism, or apologetics as a motivation to specialize in philosophy of religion. 7.9% 
of participants (N = 11) mentioned reasons for specializing in philosophy of religion that 
coders could not fit in the other groups. Results are summarized in figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Motivations for specializing in philosophy of religion, in percentage (total over 
100% as several participants offered more than one reason).  
Looking in more detail at the responses to this open question, the emerging theme from 
respondents who answered upbringing, identity or both (i.e., 1 and/or 2) is that to them, 
philosophy of religion is a form of faith seeking understanding. When combining 
upbringing and religious identity as explicit motivators for engaging in philosophy of 
religion, 43.9% of respondents mentioned either or both of these factors:  
I am a catholic, and philosophy of religion helps me in deepening my faith 
by way of—paradoxically—putting the faith itself into question and even 
criticizing it. — male assistant professor, public university, Italy. 
I’m a cerebral religious person and thinking carefully about my faith is a 
plus not a negative. I particularly enjoy working on the philosophical 
aspects of moral and religious diversity. Perhaps I am getting a better 
understanding of other faiths and denominations when I do this. — female 
full professor, research-oriented university, UK.  
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I was raised Catholic and have a strong respect for that tradition. This 
respect has led me to be interested in other traditions as well. At the same 
time, as I have studied philosophy, I have been intrigued by arguments for 
atheism. My parents were deeply religious and intellectually engaged with 
their faith; this has surely had an influence on me. — male associate 
professor, secular small liberal arts college, US.  
Some atheist philosophers of religion were also motivated by upbringing and questions 
of their religious identity:  
When I was a child I was a very committed believer and participant in 
Christianity. I gradually lost my faith, and the finishing element was a 
section on philosophy of religion when I took an introductory philosophy 
course in my first year at university. The shock was huge and (believe it or 
not), I was somewhat suicidal: I felt I no longer had any meaning in my life. 
I think, ever since then, I have been trying to understand what happened to 
me, and wondering whether I really needed to abandon my faith. I also find 
philosophy of religion intellectually fascinating. — female full professor, 
research-intensive university, country not disclosed.  
Many respondents reported an interest in the philosophical ideas that are explored in 
philosophy of religion (33.1%), for instance, “I wanted to find out whether any general 
religious claims about reality like “God exists” are true or false.” Some respondents 
thought philosophy of religion was also a good field to specialize in for pragmatic 
reasons:  
I’ve always been interested in the philosophy of religion but have 
specialised in it for a number of reasons. The contemporary debates tend 
to be on broader (metaphysical) problems than those in metaphysics, 
which tend to get very technical, and it sometimes seems as though the 
debate has strayed too far from the original question. The quality of work 
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in the philosophy of religion tends to be lower than that in metaphysics, so 
there are more obvious things to say in the debates. Also, as an atheist, I 
feel I can engage with the arguments and positions from an objective 
position. — female graduate student, research-intensive university, UK.  
Few of the respondents were explicitly motivated by proselytism, witness, or 
apologetics (7.2%):  
My religious commitment helps to motivate some of the work I do (part of 
which involves defending and explicating Christian doctrine). — male 
assistant professor, research-oriented university, Canada.  
I was and am a Christian. I believed that philosophy could provide tools for 
giving much-needed arguments for the existence of God and for Christian 
doctrines, which I would publish. — male emeritus professor, research 
university, UK.  
The respondents who gave this motivation (N = 10) were all Christian theists, which 
means that 12.5% of Christian theists in this sample aver that they are driven by 
proselytism (the actual percentage might well be higher, but it is interesting that there is 
a minority of respondents who recognize this as an explicit motivator).  
Several respondents noted the cultural, historical, or sociological dimensions of religion 
as a motivating factor for engaging in their research (14.4%). More atheists (16% of 
atheists) than theists (9.6% of theists) were drawn to philosophy of religion for this 
reason:  
Even though I do not believe in any religion or God(s), I do know that 
religion is an essential part of our culture. I am interested in the 
phenomenology of religious belief simply because it has been so important 
in shaping our society, and in particular art/literature/etc., and even people 
who are not religious do live in a society that is importantly religious in 
 21 
many ways. — female graduate student, research-intensive department, 
UK.  
20.1% of respondents mentioned undergraduate education, inspirational professors, 
scholars whose work they read during their education, and other education-related 
reasons for specializing in philosophy of religion, for instance this respondent mentions 
both educational reasons and philosophical interests:  
I grew up in the Christian school system, so I knew my way around religion, 
despite growing more and more secular as the years went by. I was (and 
still am) very interested in medieval philosophy, which is what led me to 
questions in philosophy of religion. Since then, I have spent a year in a very 
old, German theological faculty, which awakened interest in figures like 
Schleiermacher and Otto, and my interests have now turned to religious 
experience and philosophical accounts of faith and secularism. — female 
postdoctoral research fellow, public university, Germany.  
4.4 Change in religious belief and philosophical practice  
Coders coded the responses to question 7, “Did your religious beliefs change over time, 
especially in the time since you were a philosopher? Could you describe this change (if 
applicable)?” using the following categories: (1) Little or no change, (2) More grounding 
or sophistication of beliefs, e.g., believing something on the basis of arguments that the 
respondent held unreflectively before, (3) Tempering of beliefs: participants have 
become less dogmatic or less entrenched in their beliefs, without giving up those beliefs, 
(4) Change from one religious view to another, (5) From religious belief to nonbelief or 
agnosticism, (6) From agnosticism or atheism to religious belief, (7) Other: any pattern 
that does not fit 1–6.  
Although the coding scheme was fairly complex to be able to categorize a wide variety 
of observed changes, the most common coding was Other with 23.7% of respondents (N 
= 33). 18% (N =25) responded with little or no change. 16.5% (N = 23) felt their religious 
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views had become more grounded and/or sophisticated as a result of their engagement 
with philosophy of religion. About the same number, 15.8% (N = 22) reported a 
tempering of religious beliefs (including atheism) to less extreme positions. Only 3.6% (N 
= 5) changed from one religious view/affiliation to another as a direct result of working 
in philosophy of religion. 12.2% (N = 17) went from religious belief to nonbelief, often as 
undergraduates, when encountering philosophical objections to theism. By contrast, 
9.4% (N =13) went from agnosticism or atheism to religious belief. Of the current 
atheists in the sample (N = 25), 7 are former religious believers, of the current agnostics 
(N = 8), 5 are former religious believers. This amounts to 33% of both atheists and 
agnostics being former religious believers. By contrast, of the current theists (N = 85) in 
the sample, only 11 (12.9%) were former atheists and agnostics. This difference is 
statistically significant, Fisher’s exact test, two-tailed  (N = 118), p < 0.01. Of the theists 
who converted to atheism, several stated that they had held unreflective religious 
beliefs before they studied philosophy. They subsequently began to question and 
abandon them:  
I was a theist when I began university. It was during reading Hume’s 
Dialogues in my second year that I began the road to atheism. I believed 
that Hume successfully undermined every rational reason I had for my 
personal belief in God ... I have to admit that I initially felt very confused, 
lost, ashamed and angry when I realized that I no longer could count myself 
as a believer. But, at the same time, I had an overriding curiosity to 
understand how it was that I became such an ardent believer to begin with. 
— male research associate, public university, UK.  
For one respondent, his growing disenchantment with arguments for theism was the 
final push for him to become an atheist:  
I was a moderate Christian entering college ... I recall specifically the straw 
that broke the camel’s back—that made me finally admit that I was an 
atheist. I was reading the arguments in a book called [redacted]. The theist 
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in the debate was [redacted], and his arguments were so bad and he so 
obviously willfully ignored the arguments of his opponent that I finally said 
“I can’t be on this side anymore”... This is not what convinced me that 
atheism is true—I was already convinced of that—but this is what made it 
okay in my eyes to finally admit that I was an atheist. If I truly cared about 
reason, rationality and truth, I could not self-identify as a theist anymore. 
— male associate professor, liberal arts college, US.  
An atheist who converted to theism after exposure to philosophical arguments wrote:  
In the beginning of my studies in philosophy of religion, I was an atheist (at 
least in the sense of lacking belief in God). I investigated many many 
arguments for and against the existence of God. I discovered that my initial 
impression of “the” arguments was overly simplistic ... In the end (or the 
next beginning), the arguments for God seemed to win out, and so I began 
to lean toward belief in God. As I’ve progressed further in philosophy, I 
seemed to find many reasons to think God exists, and the reasons against 
God seemed less persuasive. Of course, I’m aware of the problem of 
polarization, and so I try to keep testing various arguments and listening to 
those who see things differently ... rechecking the arguments. — male 
assistant professor, research-oriented university, US.  
Many respondents (20.8%) provided a complex history of their beliefs over time:  
I went from agnosticism to atheism and back again for a time, experienced 
a brief conversion to a broad theism about ten years in, and more recently 
settled on a non-naturalistic atheism. — male full professor, small liberal 
arts college, no country provided.  
Some participants expressed more grounding and/or sophistication of their religious 
beliefs as their work in philosophy of religion progressed, e.g., “I grew in understanding 
of the things I believed”, “I have become more historically grounded and sophisticated 
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in my beliefs, as well as having better epistemological support for my beliefs.”  
Some philosophers noted a tempering in more extreme atheist or religious views as a 
result of their exposure to philosophy; often this was the mere fact of being exposed to 
other views:  
I was raised in a very conservative, Protestant evangelical home, and I 
attended a high school and a college that fit well into this tradition. In 
graduate school I realized for the first time what it would be like (in the 
Nagelian sense) to have a purely secular mindset ... This precipitated a 
crisis of faith that lasted about three years. Ultimately I returned to 
Christian faith but in a significantly changed way ... Attitudinally I would say 
I emerged with a freer mindset—a greater willingness to question received 
doctrine, and less worry about having the “right” theology—than I went in 
with. — male associate professor, comprehensive state university, US. 
4.5 The relationship between religious beliefs and philosophical practice  
How do participants see the relationship between their religious beliefs and 
commitments and their philosophical work (question 8: “How would you describe the 
relationship between your personal religious beliefs, or lack thereof, and your work in 
philosophy of religion”)? The answers were coded as (1) Intimate relationship, (2) Looser 
relationship, (3) No relationship, (4) Religion takes precedence over philosophy, (5) 
Philosophy takes precedence over religion, and (6) Other. The largest group (33.1%, N = 
46) saw the relationship as intimate:  
The two inform each other very closely. I hold philosophical views in large 
part because I find them to be Biblical and I interpret the Bible through the 
lens of philosophy of religion. For me, the two do not and should not come 
apart. — female adjunct professor, middle-sized university, US. 
10.1% (N = 14) described a looser relationship:  
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I do not think that I am interested in religion because I am an atheist. 
Rather, it is fascinating to me that anyone should be anything but an 
atheist. In addition, I think it vital that we understand the impact of religion 
upon society, both in its positive and its negative aspects. — male 
professor, private secular university, Poland. 
For 20 respondents (14.4%), religious beliefs are the most important, and their 
philosophical work is ancillary to it:  
My philosophy falls under the umbrella of my religion, particularly my 
reading of the Bible. If philosophy led to some conclusion contrary to the 
plain reading of the Scripture, I would ‘redo my sums,’ so to speak. — male 
assistant professor, Christian liberal arts college, US.  
A smaller group of participants, 6.5% (N = 9) has a “philosophy first” view, where 
philosophy has the final word:  
My philosophical convictions crowd out any vestiges of religious ones. — 
female full professor, secular university, US.   
 11.5% (N = 16) claimed there was little or no relationship between their personal beliefs 
and their philosophical work:  
There’s a presupposition here I reject. My beliefs have little to do with my 
religious practices, and my work in philosophy of religion isn’t about what I 
believe. It is about defending various conservative theological stances, but 
it is a deep and important question whether I believe the things I defend. I 
am committed to them, though. — male distinguished professor, research-
intensive faith-based university, US.  
The remaining 34 respondents (24.4%) had a relationship that was not easily 
categorized. I will quote two examples to give a flavor of the complicated relationships 
participants mentioned:  
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I think this relationship is complex. It is certainly there. Anyone who claims 
their research interests are not related to their personal narratives is either 
lying or living the sort of soul-stultifying existence that does not become 
the life of the mind. What the relationship is exactly is hard for me to 
discern. At times, I am exploring or even just playing with parts of the 
conceptual landscape that happen to have something to do with God or a 
religious worldview. At other times, I feel I am combating noxious poisons 
that threaten truths of essential importance. At other times, I think I am 
trying to explain myself to myself or am even complaining to God in an 
academic venue. — male assistant professor, small liberal arts college, US.  
I would say that my personal religious beliefs partly *motivate* my work 
and even *influence* it, but they do not dictate it.  A recurring motif in my 
philosophical thinking and writing is rejection of (or at least a *wariness 
about*) naturalistic reductionism and methodological skepticism.  These 
are not core religious doctrines, of course, but they make sense in the light 
of my religious commitments, and they help in turn to make sense of those 
religious commitments as well.  And they have brought application in 
philosophy generally – male full professor, small liberal arts college, US. 
4.6 How philosophers of religion view their area of specialization  
Many respondents spontaneously offered criticisms of their discipline for question 9 
(“Are there any additional anecdotes or personal observations that you think are 
relevant for this study?”). While most of these were atheists or agnostics, some theists 
were also critical of philosophy of religion. Criticisms were mainly directed at the 
apologetic nature of philosophy of religion, its perceived lack of real-world relevance, 
and its lack of attention for traditions outside of Christianity. Here is a selection:  
Philosophy of religion is too much focused on issues of what is true and 
what is false, from a doctrinal standpoint, and my latest thinking is that 
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such issues aren’t primary. — male distinguished philosopher of religion, 
US.   
The ‘rigour’ and analytical ‘skills’ in this branch of philosophy has kept its 
(Christian) philosophers isolated and distant from the social, ethical and 
political changes taking place in other branches of analytic philosophy. 
Insularity has allowed the field to protect and to encourage narrow-
mindedness and overconfidence in the thinking of the best known (and 
best funded) philosophers of religion in the world. — female full professor, 
secular university, UK.  
I would not be the first to say that philosophy of religion, especially 
“analytic theology,” is simply not philosophy. It’s Christian apologetics, and 
it often is poorer philosophically because of that. A Christian bias pervades 
everything, and, once one becomes a non-Christian, the irrational faith-
based assumptions and intuitions start to stand out. Philosophy of religion 
is increasingly out of touch with the actual practice of religion in Europe 
and the Americas. It needs to be revitalized by making contact with the rich 
religious pluralism now evolving in Europe and the Americas. We need to 
see articles by analytic philosophers on Mormonism, Santeria, Umbanda, 
Wicca, goddess religion, religious naturalism, new pantheistic movements, 
and on and on. — male full professor, state university, US.  
Philosophy of religion is a field well-suited to contribute helpful resources 
for clarifying confusion as well as disagreement at areas of cross-cultural 
contact, but the field may be hindered in this effort so long as it employs 
models of religiosity that have been derived from philosophical debates 
within Western Christianity. — male visiting assistant professor, small 
liberal arts college, China.   
4.7 Summary of the findings: Addressing the empirical question  
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With this survey, I investigated the empirical question of the extent to which IFs, such as 
upbringing and education, shape views in the philosophy of religion. I show that 
philosophers of religion are indeed influenced by such factors, and that these have an 
impact on their philosophical work. The answer to the empirical question is therefore 
yes, philosophers of religion are influenced by IFs in forming their philosophical 
attitudes. For instance, 43.9% of respondents explicitly gave their religious upbringing 
and/or identity as a motivation for engaging in philosophy of religion. Also, only 11.5% 
of participants said there was no relationship between their personal religious beliefs 
and their work in philosophy of religion. As I argued in section 3, due to socially 
desirable responding, and lack of awareness of some biases and influences respondents 
likely did not list all the IFs exhaustively, so the role of IFs might be even stronger than 
this study suggests.  
In the sample, significantly more atheists who engage in philosophy of religion were 
former theists than the reverse. This asymmetry can be explained by the fact that 
philosophy of religion attracts people who find religion important, and such people are 
more likely to have a religious background or upbringing. The theme of faith seeking 
understanding that emerged in this survey supports this hypothesis. Those who come 
into contact with philosophy of religion as long-time atheists are less likely to be 
interested in the subject matter. The high percentage of Christian theists in this sample 
(57.6%), several of whom explicitly endorse orthodox beliefs, such as expressed in the 
Nicene Creed, demonstrates that this group is highly represented in philosophy of 
religion, especially as compared to philosophy in general. The low representation of 
theists outside of Christianity (3.6%), agnostics (5.8%), and the relatively small number 
of respondents who fall outside of the classical theism, atheism, or agnostic divide 
(10.8%), is reflected in the published work in philosophy of religion, which is mostly 
concerned with Christian theism, generic theism, or atheism.  
The view that philosophy of religion is primarily a form of apologetics—voiced by some 
participants in the survey—is not confirmed in this study, since only 7.2% of 
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respondents (12.5% of Christians in the sample) provide proselytism, witness, or 
apologetics as a reason to engage in philosophy of religion. Some of the reasons 
philosophers of religion chose to specialize in this discipline are probably similar to the 
reasons other philosophers have for their specializations: 33.1% expressed an interest in 
the philosophical ideas that philosophy of religion explores, and 20.1% mentioned 
education as a source of their enthusiasm for the subject.  
 
5. Does the role of irrelevant factors challenge views in philosophy of religion?  
This paper started out with two questions: the empirical question (whether philosophy 
of religion is influenced by IFs) and the epistemological question (whether the influence 
of IFs on philosophical views should worry us). In the previous section, I addressed the 
empirical question. In this section, I will concentrate on the epistemological question. As 
we have seen, most moderate permissivists (e.g., Vavova, 2018) do not think that all IFs 
are benign, and acknowledge that in some cases we do need to revise our beliefs, or 
lower our confidence that p when we become aware that it was formed as a result of an 
IF. By contrast, proponents of uniqueness (e.g., White 2014) think that IFs are akin to 
ingesting a pill that causes one to form a belief at random. Unfortunately, there is no 
generally-agreed principled account of which IFs are innocuous and which are 
pernicious. Schoenfield (2014) recommends to look at the extent to which the beliefs 
formed through IFs are in tension with one’s other beliefs. According to her, beliefs 
formed early in life (for instance, through upbringing) are less likely to be in tension with 
one’s other beliefs, and thus we are permitted to maintain such beliefs. One 
unfortunate consequence of this view is that one can hold patently false and irrational 
beliefs, as long as they form a coherent belief system and were acquired early in life, 
e.g., someone who was raised with scientologist or young earth creationist views could 
maintain them rationally, as long as she refuses to incorporate scientific views in tension 
with her prior beliefs. This makes the rationality of beliefs overtly dependent on the 
chronological order in which they are acquired. Kelly (2014) holds a more stringent 
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position, arguing that rational responses are situated within a certain range. For 
instance, it would be irrational to deny anthropogenic causes of climate change given 
the evidence, but there is still a range of rational responses about the severity of effects 
of climate change, such as the projected rise in sea levels. One problem with the range 
view5 is that it does not make any claims about which IFs should worry us, but rather 
concentrates on the responses that are reasonable in the light of IFs. For instance, one 
could be subject to a clearly bad IF, such as White’s (2014) hypothetical pill-popping 
cases, which would still be fine if the resulting belief fell within an acceptable range. 
Vavova (2018, 145) proposes that we only have to revise our belief that p when we have 
independent reasons to assume that IFs make our belief that p unreliable. She 
formulates the Good Independent Reason Principle (GIRP). If recognizing such IFs gives 
you “good independent reason to think that you are mistaken with respect to p, you 
must revise your confidence in p accordingly—insofar as you can.” Given that this 
heuristic still allows quite a lot of latitude, and since IFs are pervasive in the formation of 
the philosophical views of philosophers of religion, this heuristic seems useful for 
evaluating IFs in this field.  
We have so far seen that the answer to the empirical question is an unequivocal yes. 
Should this influence of IFs on the work of philosophers of religion be a cause for 
concern? From the armchair, some authors have argued that philosophy of religion is 
subject to IFs that are harmful for the discipline. Here follow their main objections:  
Self-selection: IFs, such as Christian upbringing or personal religious identity, have 
motivated a majority of philosophers of religion to specialize in it. There is thus an 
unhealthy self-selection going on in philosophy of religion (Draper & Nichols, 2013).  
Prejudice: IFs, such as atheist and Christian beliefs, make it hard for philosophers of 
religion to assess evidence and arguments in their discipline in a dispassionate manner 
because they have a personal stake in it (Levine, 2000).                                                          
5 For another criticism, see Horowitz (2014).  
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Constraint: the cultural background of the majority of philosophers of religion (western 
Christian theism or naturalism) has led them to regard Christian theism and naturalism 
as the default options, thus ruling out a variety of other potentially philosophically 
viable beliefs (Schellenberg, 2015; Schilbrack, 2014).  
Considering self-selection first, as we have seen, the majority of respondents admit they 
are influenced by IFs, such as religious identity (e.g., being a Christian), education and 
upbringing, to a greater extent than by intrinsically philosophical interests—although to 
a minority, the latter was also a contributing factor. This leads to self-selection among 
philosophers of religion. Non-Christians or people with a non-Christian background lack 
this motivation. While this results in a relative lack of diversity in the profession, does it 
provide individual philosophers of religion with reasons to revise their confidence in the 
philosophical views they hold, using GIRP? Suppose a Christian philosopher of religion, 
upon reading this study realizes he is also one of these Christians who became 
interested in the subject because of his religious upbringing. This fact, by itself, does not 
give him independent reasons to think his philosophical views are unreliable, unless it 
turns out that Christians would be less good at engaging in philosophical work. One 
unfortunate side-effect of self-selection is that one may end up in an echo-chamber. If 
philosophers of religion are mainly surrounded by people who think like them, they are 
lulled into a false sense of consensus, i.e., that the positions they endorse are accepted 
in the wider philosophical community, which is not the case6. Still, by itself self-selection 
does not seem to be a compelling reason to revise one’s philosophical views.  
Prejudice is a more serious charge, hinting at an unhealthy conflict of interest where 
philosophers of religion, whether atheist, theist, or otherwise inclined, are merely 
arguing for and confirming what they already believe. Confirmation bias, which lies at 
the basis of prejudice, is a prevalent phenomenon (Nickerson, 1998). When a subject S is 
already convinced that p, S will typically evaluate evidence and arguments in favor of p 
as stronger than arguments against p. She is disposed to devote resources to find                                                         
6 Thank you to David Christensen for alerting me to this possibility.  
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counterarguments and evidence against data that do not fit her belief that p. S’s 
philosophical views would be widely different, depending on whether she was raised in 
a theist or atheist household, and so would have been the arguments with which she 
defends her philosophical views. Her way of gathering and evaluating evidence is thus 
dependent on an initial state in a way that seems pernicious (see Kelly, 2008, for similar 
concerns).  
This survey suggests that prejudice might not be as serious a problem in the philosophy 
of religion as is commonly assumed. We can think of prejudice as a claim about how IFs 
color one’s evaluation of philosophical evidence: it could be so pervasive that one never 
changes one’s mind as a result of philosophical inquiry, or it could be so weak that one 
changes one’s religious views profoundly when one comes into contact with philosophy 
of religion. The evidence presented here suggests that little or no change is relatively 
rare, but that conversions (from atheism or agnosticism to theism, from theism to 
agnosticism or atheism, or from one religion, denomination, or movement to another) 
are not very common either, together about a quarter of respondents. The majority of 
participants experienced some degree of tempering, deepening, further grounding, or a 
more complex change in their views as a result of engagement with philosophy of 
religion. Given that lack of change was rare (18% saw little or no change in their 
outlooks), prejudice is less of a problem in philosophy of religion than is commonly 
thought.  
Constraint looks at the range of positions philosophers of religion typically defend, and 
states that they have been unduly constrained in their consideration of alternative 
positions (e.g., polytheism, Taoism) as a result of their cultural background. There is 
relatively little work in non-Christian theist philosophy which may be due to the fact that 
very few philosophers of religion are, for instance, Buddhist or neo-Pagan. With a mainly 
western Christian or post-Christian background, philosophers of religion tend to see a 
generic form of theism, Christian theism (exploring concepts like the Trinity or the 
Incarnation), and scientific naturalism as the default options. Thick non-Christian beliefs, 
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such as Mormon eternal progression or Jain jiva (the essence of a living being that gets 
reincarnated through different life forms), are ignored. Yet they seem as worthy of 
philosophical exploration as thick Christian views, which have received ample attention 
in the philosophical literature (see e.g., the cottage industry on the Latin and social 
Trinity that has sprung up in recent years).  
Does the realization that philosophers of religion have left many options unexplored 
provide them with a reason for skepticism about their current philosophical beliefs? 
Although constraint looks superficially similar to self-selection, it has considerably more 
skeptical force. For self-selection, a philosopher of religion is asked to consider whether 
her motivations might give her any reasons for doubting the beliefs she holds. For 
constraint, she has to consider that a vast conceptual space of religious views is left 
philosophically unexplored because of haphazard factors in the upbringing and religious 
backgrounds of philosophers of religion. The realization that IFs constrain the range of 
viable options does provide a reason to reconsider one’s confidence in one’s 
philosophical views, given that one did not consider a much wider range of possible 
views from the outset. To take an analogy, suppose you have a book with challenging 
puzzles. For one puzzle, you are given three possible answers. You are told that there is 
only one solution, and asked to provide good arguments for why the one you choose is 
correct. You carefully consider the options, and eventually provide arguments in favor of 
one of them. But then you notice that some pages were torn out of the book. Upon 
browsing an undamaged copy, it turns out that instead of only three answers, there are 
30 possible answers. It seems rational to reduce your confidence in the position you 
have argued for, even though you were even-handed in your (limited) choice. Without 
considering the other solutions, your confidence seems misguided. Likewise, if a 
philosopher of religion comes to a carefully argued scientific naturalism, thin 
monotheism, or Christian theism, her confidence should be shaken in the face of the 
role of IFs in leading her and other philosophers of religion to consider only these as 
serious options. Constraint has a negative epistemic impact on work in philosophy of 
religion.  
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6. Conclusion  
Do irrelevant influences play a role in philosophy, and if so, should this worry us? I have 
examined these questions through a qualitative study among academic philosophers of 
religion. Philosophy of religion is a field where we can expect a large impact of IFs, given 
how intertwined religious views (including atheism and agnosticism) are with everyday 
life. I examined the empirical question, viz. to what extent philosophers of religion are 
influenced by factors such as personal motivation and upbringing in their choice of their 
area of specialization, and in their philosophical work. This qualitative survey indicates 
that philosophers of religion are at least to some extent aware of IFs and that personal 
religious life and philosophical positions are intertwined.  
For the epistemological question of whether these factors negatively influence 
philosophy of religion, I have taken a moderately permissivist viewpoint—at least in 
some cases, we can rationally respond to a given body of evidence while being subject 
to IFs and thereby come to different conclusions. However, if we have reasons to think 
IFs make our beliefs unreliable, we should re-evaluate these beliefs. I have outlined 
three worries for philosophers of religion: the role of self-selection, prejudice, and 
constraint in the cultural backgrounds of its practitioners. Although self-selection and 
prejudice are frequently flagged as problems for philosophy of religion, they do not 
require revision of opinions. I have shown that constraint plays a negative epistemic role 
in philosophy of religion, and that realizing how it limits the scope of philosophical 
investigation does require a re-evaluation of views in philosophy of religion.  
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